THE DOCTRINE OF LICENSEE REPUDIATION IN PATENT LAW
THE public has an interest in the adjudication of patents of questionable validity I and the law provides procedures whereby private persons may advance this interest.
2 But a licensee generally cannot attack the validity of a patent while he is licensed thereunder.
2 Thus in an action for royalties under a patent license agreement a licensee is usually estopped to assert the invalidity of the patent as a defense. Co. v. Griscom-Russell Co., 273 Fed. 703, 705 (3d Cir. 1922) . See Note, 47 CoL L. Rm 477, 435 (1947) . That the public interest in patent adjudication has been increasingly recognized is shown by the development of exceptions to the estoppel rule to be noted in the text. In addition, showings of the prior art have been allowed to narrow patent claims. Kenyon v. Automatic Instrument Co., 18G F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1951) . And the federal courts, realizing the importance of validity determinations, sometimes make gratuitous findings. See Sinclair & Carroll Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945) . See Note, 61 YALE L.J. 93 (1952) .
For a discussion of the relationship of patents to the public interest, see generally, HA-IiLTON, PrENrs AND F=r. ExNr~ahm5E (TNEC Monograph 31, 1941).
2. A person sued for infringement may challenge patent validity. United Chromium, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1936) ; A. B. Dick Co. v. Simplicator Corp.. 34 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1929 ). The usual defenses to an infringement suit are noninfringement and patent invalidity. See Krichbaum v. McDanel, 2M. Fed. 455 (6th Cir. 1922 ). That even a defense of non-infringement may call forth a judicial determination of patent validity, see Note, 61 YAi_ L.J. 93 (1952) .
If a controversy in regard to a patent exists between a patentee and another person, that person can secure a patent validity determination under the federal declaratory judgment statute. 48 STAT. 955 (1934) 942 (1948) , as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (Supp. 1952). As to the right of the Government to challenge patent validity in antitrust proceedings, scc United States v.
The origin of patent licensee estoppel is in the contract doctrine that one receiving bargained-for benefits under a contract may not question the consideration he has received. 5 The rule is of judicial creation and is not found in patent legislation. 6 Whether it was originally a rule of state or federal law is uncertain ;7 nevertheless, both federal and state courts have developed exceptions to the estoppel doctrine.
8
Where a patent is declared invalid in a suit involving the patentee and a third party, one exception to the estoppel rule may arise on the theory of failure of consideration. The consideration for an exclusive licensee's promise to pay royalties is the monopoly dependent upon patent validity, as well as freedom from an infringement suit by the licensor.
9 If the patent is judicially declared invalid, the exclusive licensee is evicted from his monopoly; consideration fails and the licensee may assert the patent invalidity decision as prior art to limit the scope of the claims of the patentee. REv. 94, 96 (1943) .
7. See Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 175 (1942) . The rule is applied in both federal and state courts. United States v. Harvey Steel Co., 196 U.S. 310 (1905) ; Eastern States Petroleum Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 22 Del. Ch. 333, 2 A.2d 138 (Ch. 1938) .
8. See notes 10, 13, 16 infra and accompanying text. The jurisdiction of state courts to try patent validity as an issue ancillary to a contract action for royalties is well settled. E.g., NOTES a defense to an action for royalties accruing after such decision.
10 But a nonexclusive licensee is regarded as having bargained only for the right to use the patent free from an infringement suit by his licensor ;"1 the licensee neither expects nor receives any exclusive rights dependent upon patent validity. Here a decision of invalidity generally does not constitute an eviction since the licensee will continue to receive protection from an infringement suit by his licensor,'-' dubious as the value of that protection may be.
Another exception to the general applicability of licensee estoppel is based upon antitrust policy. The estoppel rule does not apply if the licensing agreement under which the patentee sues contains a price-fixing or other clause which, in the absence of a valid patent, would be illegal under the antitrust laws.
13 Public interest in free competition demands that the patent be litigated and any estoppel rule to the contrary must yield. The potentially most effective exception to the estoppel doctrine is frankly based on the public interest in freedom of manufacture unencumbered by invalid patents.'
3 If a licensee repudiates the license agreement by clear and unequivocal notice to the patentee, abandoning its protection, he may thereafter assert the invalidity of the patent as a defense to an action for royalties. pendent of contract law, so that licensees may challenge patents in the interest of unrestricted manufacture.
7 However, this exception to the general estoppel rule requires that the repudiation be definite.' 8 Initially at least, an equivocal stand would permit a licensee to defend an action for royalties with a claim of repudiation and to defeat a suit for infringement by pointing to the license.' 9
The repudiation doctrine, which originated in New York, 2 0 has not met with wide acceptance.
21 Where there appears neither breach nor consent by the licensor, many courts hold the license contract irrevocable. 22 Since the repudiation doctrine need look neither to the patentee's breach nor consent, these courts deny the doctrine, criticizing it on contract theory as an unjusti- 19. Thus the patentee, whether he chose initially to sue for royalties or for infringement, would be faced with possible dismissal in either suit independent of the validity of his patent, since the patent issue would not be raised. See Skinner v. Machine Co., 140 N.Y. 217, 222, 35 N.E. 491, 492 (1893) . Estoppel by record could prevent the licensee's change of defense in the alternative suit by the patentee. See Note, 39 HARv. L. REv. 637, 639 (1926) .
Repudiation, like eviction, is never a defense to an action for royalties accrued before such renunciation; until repudiation the licensee has received the bargained-for consideration. Universal Rim Co. v. Scott, 21 F.2d 346 (N.D. Ohio 1922) ; Armstrong Co. v. Shell Co., 98 Cal. App. 769, 277 Pac. 887 (1929) . See Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 176 F.2d 799, 809 (1st Cir. 1949 ), aff'd, 339 U.S. 827 (1950 24 And contract principles should be inapplicable. The estoppel rule on one side and the exceptions thereto on the other are motivated by conflicting desires to protect the patentee in the enjoyment of his property 2 5 and to secure for the public the advantages of manufacture unrestricted by invalid patent monopolies. 20 Although in theory patents are awarded only for novel contributions to the progress of science and the useful arts, 27 an overburdened Patent Office frequently grants protection to unpatentable inventions. 25 But an invalid unadjudicated patent may cause potential users to secure a license or to refrain from use. Thus the holder of an invalid patent may be able to establish a monopoly, enjoying all the advantages theoretically afforded only to holders of valid patents. 29 But monopolies should be permitted only where they serve a public purpose.3° The holder of a valid patent is regarded as having contributed sufficiently to the public good through his invention and its public disclosure to warrant grant of a monopoly as a reward and as an incentive to further invention.P But the 
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holder of an invalid patent has made no such contribution and the maintenance of the monopoly is unjustified.3 2 The estoppel rule protects both valid and invalid patents from attack by those licensed thereunder. When applied against one licensed under an invalid patent, estoppel reduces the chances of an invalidity declaration, keeping closed the door to use by others.
The repudiation doctrine opens an additional road to patent validity determination. Potential subjection of valid patents to litigation should be irrelevant, for where the public interest and private rights conflict, fairness between the parties is not the touchstone. 83 Yet the doctrine affords the patentee the protection of notice, 3 4 enabling him to select the appropriate remedy and setting the date to which he can recover royalties regardless of patent validity. 35 And it is unlikely that licensees will repudiate lightly: a patent is presumptively valid and the challenger's burden of proof is heavy.
0 Moreover, patent litigation is usually a costly undertaking. 7 The repudiation doctrine requires the licensee to consider these factors before he gives the unequivocal notice which may force him into litigation.
38
The doctrine of repudiation may yield only a state court patent validity determination.
9 But every adjudication is in the public interest Co., 152 F.2d 895 (3d Cir. 1945) ; Strong-Scott Mfg. Co. v. Weller, 112 F.2d 389 (Sth Cir. 1940) ; Matteawan Mfg. Co. v. Emmons Bros. Co., 253 Fed. 372 (1st Cir. 1918 
38.
A repudiating licensee who wishes to challenge patent validity is faced with the same difficulties as an infringer who wishes to do so. He enjoys no special position after repudiation making his challenge any more onerous to a patentee than that by an infringer. However, a patent licensee, wishing to escape the burden of royalties, may be more willing to engage in litigation than an unlicensed potential user.
39. If the patentee sues for royalties, the suit, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, must be brought in a state court. See note 8 supra. If, however, the patentee accepts the repudiation, he may sue for infringement if the licensee has used the patent and the determination will be federal. A recent case has, however, undermined the repudiation doctrine in the state of its origin, holding that repudiation is ineffective to avoid licensee estoppel unless the licensee uses the patent after repudiation so the patentee can sue for infringement as an alternative to a royalties suit.
4 4 This limitation seems unwarranted.
4 5 True, the patentee cannot sue for infringement unless there has been post-repudiation use by the licensee. But if the license provided for unit royalties only, the patentee could recover nothing without licensee use in any suit. However, if the agreement contemplated minimum royalties, these would be recoverable regardless of use if the patent is declared valid in the royalties suit following repudiation. Thus the repudiation doctrine, minus a use requirement, would merely deny minimum royalties to the holder of an invalid patent licensed to one who fails to use after repudiation. And the use requirement is economically objectionable:4 it may force the licensee into undesired production if he wishes to avoid liability for royalties by challenging his licensor's patent. If the patent is relatively simple and inexpensive to use, the requirement becomes merely formal. But if use is costly, the requirement places an additional expense upon the licensee which, together with the high costs of patent litigation, 47 may force him to abandon any attempt to attack patent validity. Accepting repudiation as a means to further the public interest in patent adjudication and then denying this effect in the absence of licensee use at once opens and shuts the door on an additional way to determine patent validity.
The repudiation doctrine, unhampered by a use requirement, should be recognized as a desirable means for ridding the public of the burden of invalid patents. Such an exception to the general estoppel rule places a more powerful weapon in the hands of patent licensees, enabling private interests to work for the public good. 
